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ABSTRACT1 
Blockchain has received great attention in recent years and 
motivated innovations in different scenarios. However, many vital 
issues which affect its performance are still open. For example, it 
is widely convinced that high level of security and scalability and 
full decentralization are still impossible to achieve simultaneously. 
In this paper, we propose Bicomp, a bilayer scalable Nakamoto 
consensus protocol, which is an approach based on high security 
and pure decentralized Nakamoto consensus, and with a 
significant improvement on scalability. In Bicomp, two kinds of 
blocks are generated, i.e., microblocks for concurrent transaction 
packaging in network, and macroblocks for leadership 
competition and chain formation. A leader is elected at beginning 
of each round by using a macroblock header from proof-of-work. 
An elected leader then receives and packages multiple 
microblocks mined by different nodes into one macroblock during 
its tenure, which results in a bilayer block structure. Such design 
limits a leader’s power and encourages as many nodes as possible 
to participate in the process of packaging transactions, which 
promotes the sharding nature of the system. Furthermore, several 
mechanisms are carefully designed to reduce transaction 
overlapping and further limit a leader’s power, among which a 
novel transaction diversity based metric is proposed as the second 
level criteria besides the longest-chain-first principle on selecting 
a legitimate chain when fork happens. Security issues and 
potential attacks to Bicomp are extensively discussed and 
experiments for evaluation are performed. From the experimental 
results based on 50 nodes all over the world, Bicomp achieves 
significant improvement on scalability than that of Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, while the security and decentralization merits are still 
preserved. 
KEYWORDS 
Blockchain, Nakamoto Consensus, Proof-of-Work, Scalability, 
Bilayer 
1 Introduction 
Blockchain has received great attention from both industry 
and academia along with the boom of cryptocurrencies in recent 
                                                                 
1  The work in this article was supported partially by the NSF of China 
under Grant Nos. 61501125 and 61502018. 
years. It first appears as the foundation of the famous 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin [1] and now has evolved to a computing 
platform that enables decentralized, persistent, anonymous, and 
auditable transaction recording at Internet scale. Although 
blockchain has already motivated many innovations [2-13], it still 
faces several obstacles which hinder its widely deployment. A 
famous problem is the so-called Impossible Trinity, which means 
a blockchain system cannot simultaneously achieve the following 
three characteristics: high scalability, high security, and full 
decentralization. 
Specifically, in a blockchain platform, transactions are 
recorded by an ordered list of blocks (i.e., a blockchain). Each 
node in the system competes for the right of generating new 
blocks and the associated rewards. The process of competing and 
achieving a network-wide agreement among all participants called 
a consensus process. The consensus protocol of the first 
blockchain system, i.e., Bitcoin, is often mentioned as Nakamoto 
consensus. In Nakamoto consensus, each node is required to solve 
a computationally difficult problem for obtaining the right to 
generate a block, which is called Proof-of-Work (PoW). PoW has 
good anti-attack performance in open network environments and 
it’s the only one algorithm whose security has been verified for 
almost ten years in the real world with millions of real users. 
However, its associated resource consumption is huge and its 
scalability is poor.  
Recent emerged algorithms often aim at addressing the 
scalability issue by sacrificing some degree of decentralization. In 
this category, a famous protocol is Proof-of-Stake (PoS). The 
main idea behind PoS is simple: the probability to create a block 
and obtain the associated reward is proportional to a node’s 
owned stake in the system. PoS is based on an assumption that 
users hold more stakes would be less likely to compromise the 
system. PoS can achieve high scalability, which attracts many 
systems. For example, Ethereum [14] claims to switch from PoW 
to PoS in the near future. However, PoS may apparently lead to 
centralization to a small number of users with more stakes. 
Similarly, Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), which is a variation 
of PoS and utilized by Enterprise Operation System (EOS) [15], 
also sacrifices the fairness for scalability and thus leads to power 
centralization to several users, e.g., 21 super nodes in EOS.  
In this paper, we seek for achieving an equilibrium among the 
Impossible Trinity towards another direction. Our direction is to 
preserve PoW and its well-proven decentralization and security. 
On this basis, we seek methods to improve its scalability. For this 
purpose, let us first review the two key parameters that influence 
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result, all transactions appearing only in the replaced block(s) 
become invalid and have to be re-submitted. It is apparent that the 
more branches appear, the more computational power will be 
wasted and the longer time for confirming a transaction will be 
consumed. Therefore, the block size in Bitcoin has to be limited to 
1 MB, since a larger block size may increase the propagation 
delay and thus the probability of fork. Similarly, block interval is 
set to about ten minutes for preventing more blocks to be 
generated before the previous one has been propagated throughout 
the network. Such limitations in turn results in an upper bound on 
the number of TPS, i.e., an average of 7 TPS.  
Bitcoin-NG [16]: Bitcoin-NG is the first work that divides the 
block generation process into two separate phases: 1) leader 
election, and 2) transaction packaging. To achieve this, Bitcoin-
NG proposes two different block types: Keyblocks are generated 
through mining with PoW and are used to securely elect leaders, 
at a moderate frequency, such as every 10 minutes as in Bitcoin. 
Microblocks contain transactions, which are generated by elected 
leader without PoW computation. Microblocks can be produced 
continuously between the mining of two keyblocks, which 
increases the throughput. Bitcoin-NG’s decoupling of keyblocks 
from microblocks is an important idea that motivates much 
research work in this area. However, a leader in Bitcoin-NG has 
enough power to hurt the system, i.e., a leader in his epoch can 
intentionally forge or rewrite history and invalidate transactions 
without any cost, which make Bitcoin-NG to be vulnerable to 
selfish or malicious manners. Moreover, since all transactions 
must be received by the leader, this may result in extra latency or 
omission of receiving remote transactions at the leader and thus 
affects the throughput. 
ByzCoin [17]: ByzCoin is a novel Byzantine consensus 
protocol that achieves Byzantine consensus while preserving 
Bitcoin’s open membership by dynamically forming hash power-
proportionate consensus committee. Such a committee replaces 
the single leader in Bitcoin-NG, which is the key improvement of 
ByzCoin for maintaining the security of the system. In ByzCoin, 
when a node solves the hash puzzle of PoW, it can then become a 
member of the current consensus committee and has the power to 
vote for microblocks by using a modified PBFT algorithm. 
ByzCoin organizes the consensus committee into a 
communication tree where the most recent miner (the committee 
leader) is at the root. The committee leader runs PBFT to get all 
members to agree on the next block and it replaces PBFT’s O(n2) 
MAC-authenticated all-to-all communication with a primitive 
called scalable collective signing (CoSi) [22] that reduces 
messaging complexity to O(n). However, in ByzCoin, a malicious 
committee leader can potentially reject transactions by not 
proposing them or exclude nodes from the consensus process, 
which will hurt the safety and fairness. Furthermore, since a new 
microblock in ByzCoin must cite the previous one, its throughput 
is largely decreased due to the loss of parallelism. 
Conflux [19]: The key novelty of Conflux is it allows 
multiple participants to contribute to the Conflux blockchain 
concurrently while still keeping safety of the chain. In Conflux, 
when a node generates a new block by PoW, it identifies a 
predecessor as the parent block for the new block and creates a 
parent edge between these two blocks. To incorporate 
contributions from concurrent blocks, the node also identifies all 
other blocks that have no incoming edge and creates reference 
edges from the new block to those blocks. Such reference edges 
represent that those blocks are generated before the new block. As 
a result, the edges between blocks form a direct acyclic graph 
rather than a chain. To determine the order of the concurrently 
generated blocks, Conflux establishes a pivot chain that starts 
from the genesis block and contains only parent edges. Further, all 
blocks in the direct acyclic graph are divided into epochs using 
the pivot chain. However, Conflux is built on an assumption that 
transactions in concurrent blocks will never conflict with each 
other and therefore cannot be used in open network environments 
with potential adversaries. Furthermore, similar to other DAG 
based systems such as IOTA [23], the incentive strategy of 
Conflux is not designed. Due to the openness and arbitrariness of 
the generation of blocks in DAG based protocols, how to achieve 
safe and fair incentive is still an open issue in this area. 
3 Bicomp: A Bilayer Scalable Nakamoto 
Consensus based Protocol 
In this section, we propose Bicomp, a bilayer scalable 
Nakamoto consensus protocol. We first introduce the system 
model. Next, we provide the design of Bicomp.  
3.1 System Model 
Bicomp is designed for open and untrustworthy networks 
wherein nodes may delay, drop, re-order or duplicate messages 
arbitrarily. A subset of system participants may be Byzantine 
nodes and controlled by a malicious attacker. The other nodes are 
honest and abide by the predefined protocol. In this paper, we 
assume that the total hash power of all malicious nodes is less 
than 1/4 of the system’s total hash power at any time, since the 
PoW based systems are vulnerable to selfish mining attacks by 
adversary who controlled more than 1/4 hash power of the 
network [24]. Network nodes in the system are connected by 
reliable peer-to-peer connections. Each node can generate key-
pairs but there is no trusted public key infrastructure. In addition, 
we assume that each node’s computational power in the network 
is within a certain range and no one is far better than others. 
3.2 Overview 
In this section, we first provide an overview to Bicomp. 
Bicomp divides the block generation process into two phases, 
i.e., leader election and transaction packaging, which is similar as 
Bitcoin-NG and ByzCoin. However, in Bicomp, PoW based 
computation are needed in both phases. To be specific, Bicomp 
employs two kinds of block, namely macroblock and microblock. 
The macroblocks form the main chain and each of them links to 
the previous one chronologically. Macroblock consists of a header 
and a body. The macroblock header is used to compete for 
leadership of the next round for macroblock generation. The 
generation of such a header needs a PoW based puzzle solving 
B
 
p
t
w
b
m
i
p
a
t
l
s
p
e
i
p
s
e
m
t
I
i
t
a
f
n
i
m
m
icomp: A Bila
rocess. In co
ransactions. A
hich forms a
elongs to one
icroblocks. Th
s demonstrated
The motiva
The first i
ropagation and
 large scale is 
he existence o
eader to collec
tarts to genera
arallelization 
nabling transa
nto microblock
ackaged imm
pread through 
The second
ncourage as m
ining process
o package and 
n contrast, ma
nto the macrob
he system and 
nd computing
riendly to ordi
odes as possib
ncreases the d
icroblocks is 
icroblocks. 
Bicomp in g
1) Nodes
leader
macro
2) After 
in th
micro
3) Leade
them 
broad
Fig. 2. Illustrati
yer Scalable Na
ntrast, microbl
 macroblock m
 bilayer structu
 macroblock a
e structure of t
 in Fig. 2 for cl
tions of such m
s to achieve 
 transmission o
a huge burden 
f delays in the 
t as many trans
te a new block
and sharding. 
ctions to be c
s by nearby n
ediately when 
the network.  
 is to limit the 
any nodes a
. In Bicomp, m
obtains a part o
croblock miner
lock and obtai
part of transac
 paradigm of 
nary computin
le to participa
iversity of m
estimated by th
eneral works w
 perform Po
ship to take 
block generatio
a leader is dete
e transaction 
blocks and diss
r validates the 
as a macroblo
cast it to the ne
on to the block s
kamoto Conse
ock is respon
ay contain m
re of blocks. 
nd no need to
he two blocks a
arity. 
anner are as fol
parallelization 
f a large numb
to network. In a
network, it is 
actions as poss
. Those are re
Bicomp addres
oncurrently ve
odes. As a res
being generat
power and earn
s possible to 
icroblock mine
f the transactio
 can only pack
n the block gen
tion fees. In B
PoW for micr
g devices for e
te in the mini
icroblocks. He
e diversity of tr
ith the followi
W computatio
charge of t
n; 
rmined, other n
packaging pro
eminating them
received micro
ck at the end
twork; 
tructure of Bicom
nsus Protocol
sible for pack
ultiple microb
A microblock
 refer to any 
nd their relatio
lows. 
and sharding.
er of transactio
ddition, consid
difficult for a s
ible in time bef
asons why we
ses these issu
rified and pack
ult, transaction
ed instead of 
ings of a leade
participate int
r selects transac
n fees as its re
age the microb
eration reward
icomp, the diff
oblock is set 
ncouraging as 
ng process and
re, the diversi
ansactions pack
ng steps: 
n to compete
he next roun
odes can partic
cess by gene
 to the leader;
blocks and pac
 of its tenure
p. 
aging 
locks 
 only 
other 
nship 
 The 
ns on 
ering 
ingle 
ore it 
 need 
es by 
aged 
s are 
being 
r and 
o the 
tions 
ward. 
locks 
 from 
iculty 
to be 
many 
 thus 
ty of 
ed in 
 for 
d of 
ipate 
rating 
kages 
 and 
imp
For
ove
wit
blo
sub
we
3.3
rou
a P
val
its 
Bic
ove
dif
ele
rec
com
nod
cur
blo
two
tha
for
for
hea
alw
exi
fol
is d
the
res
mo
com
are
lea
mu
ma
as 
the
wh
val
are
acc
it 
tran
sup
4) Nodes w
append i
leadersh
The above ma
lementation is
 example, mi
rlapping trans
h and also avo
ck size in Bic
sections, we w
 address the iss
 Leadershi
Each node in 
nd for generati
oW based puz
id macroblock 
role to leader 
omp, rounds f
rlapped on the
ferent leaders. 
Due to packe
cted and withi
eive different 
pete for leade
e will check th
rently held one
cks, then the n
 headers refer
t the chain fo
ks due to its p
k is solved in B
viest principle
ays follows th
stence of uncle
low, where a b
efined to be h
 same, i.e., the
erved. In this w
dification sinc
putational wo
 different. To a
der increases t
ltiple microblo
croblock, we d
follows. A cha
y have differen
ose embedded
id transactions
 manifolds. Fir
ount. Second, s
encourages th
sactions when
Except for so
presses the occ
ho received the
t to the local bl
ip of the next ro
in process is s
 non-trivial an
croblocks from
actions or even
id such situat
omp becomes
ill introduce B
ues. 
p Election v
the system can
ng new macrob
zle to generat
header is gener
and waits for m
or generating m
 timeline, and
t propagation l
n a certain zo
macroblock h
rship in this ro
e new received
. If the two he
ode will still u
to different pre
rks. A PoW b
robabilistic co
itcoin and Ethe
s, respectively
e longest branc
 block, a node 
ranch chain wi
eavier. The ma
 chain with hig
ork, we still f
e there exist
rk in Bicomp, 
void the selfis
he weight of it
cks, whose mi
efine a mechan
in with more m
t numbers of m
 microblocks c
 will be chosen
st, the effect of
elfish mining o
e leader to 
 it has choices. 
lving a fork 
urrence of fork
 new macroblo
ockchain and st
und. 
traightforward 
d requires care
 different no
 conflicting o
ion? How to r
 larger than B
icomp in detai
ia Macrobl
 compete for t
lock. The node
e a macrobloc
ated and broad
icroblocks fro
acroblocks ar
 each round is
atency, after a
ne, nodes in th
eaders from 
und. At that ti
 header and co
aders refer to t
se the one rece
vious blocks, th
ased consensu
nsistency natur
reum accordin
. That is, in 
h chain. In Et
may choose the
th more blocks
in logic behind
her computatio
ollow such idea
s two kinds 
whose comput
h mining attac
s selfish mined
ning difficulty 
ism to choose o
acroblocks wil
acroblocks; ot
ontained more
. The benefits
 macroblock m
n microblock i
choose more 
when it appe
s by the existen
Z. Jiao et
ck will verify a
art to compete 
but its design a
ful considerati
des may cont
nes, how to d
educe forks wh
itcoin’s? In n
l and explain h
ock Header
he leadership o
 should first so
k header. Onc
casted, it switch
m other nodes.
e adjacent but 
 distinguished 
 leader is alrea
is zone will s
other nodes t
me, the receiv
mpare it with 
he same previo
ived before. If 
e node will kn
s algorithm of
e [17]. Curren
g to the longest
Bitcoin, a no
hereum, since 
 heaviest chain
 and uncle blo
 their manners
nal effect will
 but with a sli
of PoW ba
ational difficult
k that a malicio
 chain by add
is often less th
ne from branch
l be chosen wh
herwise, the ch
 non-overlapp
 for such man
ining is taken i
s forbidden. Th
non-overlapp
ars, Bicomp a
ce of macroblo
 al.
nd 
for 
nd 
on. 
ain 
eal 
en 
ext 
ow 
 
f a 
lve 
e a 
es 
 In 
not 
by 
dy 
till 
hat 
ing 
the 
us 
the 
ow 
ten 
tly, 
 or 
de 
the 
 to 
cks 
 is 
 be 
ght 
sed 
ies 
us 
ing 
an 
es 
en 
ain 
ing 
ner 
nto 
ird, 
ing 
lso 
ck 
Bicomp: A Bilayer Scalable Nakamoto Consensus Protocol Z. Jiao et al.
 
 
header and its spread at the beginning of each round. The reason 
is, the size of macroblock header is only 200 bytes in Bicomp. 
Consequently, less time will be consumed for spreading it 
throughout the network, comparing with the 1 MB block of 
Bitcoin and 2KB block of Ethereum. When a node receives a 
header, it will stop competing for leadership and wait for the 
incoming macroblock, by which the potential forks are suppressed.  
Another instant a node may encounter a fork is when the node 
mines a macroblock header. In Bicomp, a node must refer to the 
last macroblock’s hash value before it starts PoW based header 
mining. However, once a node receives a different chain from the 
one it maintains, even if it has successfully generated a 
macroblock header and becomes a leader, it will still give up its 
leadership and switches to the newly received chain when the 
latter one should be legitimate, in order to maintain the 
consistency of the blockchain. 
Besides, there exists a key step before a node starts to mine a 
macroblock header. That is, a node should calculate, verify, and 
settle the transactions contained in the macroblock it wants to 
refer and also the associated fees and rewards. This is a key step 
which is helpful to guarantee the system security and avoid 
potential fraud of a leader. We will introduce this part and explain 
in detail in section 3.6. 
3.4 Packaging Transactions in Microblocks 
Microblock mining is the process that node packages 
transactions into microblocks it generates. Multiple nodes can 
mine microblock concurrently in Bicomp and most of their efforts 
will be reserved, which is very different from traditional PoW 
based mining where only one block will be reserved at last.  
In Bicomp, after a leader is elected via the mining process of 
macroblock header, it will broadcast its header to others. Other 
nodes that received the header can start to mine a microblock if 
they verify the credibility of the information contained in the 
header. In general, the verification process includes: 
1) Check the validity of information in header, such as 
height, timestamp, and especially the correctness and 
identity of the hash value of the referred previous 
macroblock; 
2) Check the correctness of the settlement results of fees 
done by the header, by reviewing and recalculating the 
related transactions based on locally stored blocks and 
information.  
A node will accept the leadership of another node only when 
it has validated the correctness and legality of the macroblock 
header sent by that node. When a node accepted a leader, it then 
starts the microblock mining process and becomes a microblock 
miner.  
A microblock miner selects transactions it has received and 
packages them as a Merkle tree [21]. In the Merkle tree, the leaf 
node stores the transaction content while the intermediate node 
stores the hash value of the content. The hash value at the tree root 
is inserted into the header of the microblock.  
Different microblock miners may select the same transactions 
to package into their microblocks and thus lead to overlapping. To 
encourage microblock miners to select transactions with low 
possibility to be overlapped with the ones packaged by other 
miners, incentives are design that when a transaction is 
overlapped with its prior ones, it will be considered non-existent 
and its miners cannot get any reward. Therefore, each microblock 
miner is motivated to select transactions that avoid confliction 
with others. For example, a miner can leverage machine learning 
or game theory based localized methods, to determine a selected 
transaction set. 
Furthermore, a networking based mechanism is leveraged by 
Bicomp to help reduce such overlapping. That is, in the 
underlying P2P network, a transaction is only relayed within 
limited hops. Such manner takes advantage of the sharding nature 
of network and reduces the possibility that the same transaction to 
be received by many different microblock miners. 
PoW based computation is the last step to generate a 
microblock. The microblock miner continuously changes the 
nonce until the calculated hash value meets the difficulty 
requirement. Information including the chosen transactions are 
involved in calculation, which aims at increasing the fraud cost of 
a malicious miner. When a verifiable microblock is produced, the 
miner will then broadcast it in the network. Next, a miner can start 
to mine another microblock until it receives the macroblock 
generated by the leader of this round.  
3.5 Macroblock Generation 
Macroblock is generated by the elected leader at its tenure and 
will also ends his tenure when finished.  
After a leader mines a macroblock header successfully as 
introduced in section 3.3, it waits and receives newly generated 
microblocks from other nodes. After verifying the microblocks, 
leader puts them into its caching pool. 
Each leader’s tenure lasts for T minutes, which starts at the 
moment when that leader sends out its mined macroblock header, 
and ends at the time when it picks microblocks from the caching 
pool and packages them together to generate a macroblock. The 
leader signs the generated macroblock and broadcasts it to the 
network. In Bicomp, a leader always waits a fixed amount of time 
T before it starts to generate a macroblock, thus different numbers 
of microblocks may be received at different rounds. In general, 
two cases will exist as follows. 
The first case is, when time T elapses, the microblocks 
received by the leader do not exceed a predefined capacity C. In 
this case, all these microblocks are adopted and encapsulated into 
the new macroblock, unless there is no transaction in a 
microblock that is not included in previous ones. 
The second case is a leader receives more microblocks than it 
can accommodate, and it will pick some to package. For a non-
malicious node, it will always select the microblocks whose 
transactions inside has lower transaction overlapping number, so 
that not only the node obtains higher rewards by itself but the 
microblock achieves a higher probability for being chosen as part 
of the legitimate chain when chain forks, as we discussed above.  
An exception will happen when the leader is a malicious node. 
Since no other node can know exactly which and how many 
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4.1 Selfish mining 
In a selfish-mining attack, attackers keep discovered blocks 
private and intentionally fork the chain. In Bicomp, selfish miners 
might either detain discovered macroblock headers or keep the 
constructed macroblocks private. While in Bicomp different 
macroblock containing the most non-overlapped transactions will 
be chosen as the legitimate one, selfish miners may have lower 
chance to develop a private branch contains more non-overlapped 
transactions than the public branch since keeping macroblock 
header private prohibits other nodes to mine microblocks on it. As 
a result, detaining a macroblock header will not be enough to 
perform a selfish mining attack. 
Another choice is to retain the constructed macroblocks, 
which is similar as Bitcoin. Bicomp demands the leader to send 
out macroblocks at the end of its tenure, which implies that the 
selfish miner cannot always retain a macroblock, because this may 
cause other nodes to discard its leadership. Instead, in Bicomp, an 
attacker can choose to construct a macroblock in advance and 
keep it private until its tenure ends, so that it can mine the next 
macroblock header with a longer time than other nodes. This 
behavior is consistent with the analysis in literature [24], so the 
conclusion therein also stands here. That is, adversary must 
control more than 1/4 hash power of the network to perform such 
attack. However, we should note that additional obstacles are set 
up by Bicomp, i.e., the above behavior will likely in turn make the 
hidden macroblock contain less non-overlapped transactions than 
normal public ones. This implies extra cost and risk to an attacker 
since if there exist multiple macroblocks in the network. In that 
case, the selfish mined ones are likely to be discarded by honest 
nodes. 
4.2 Double-Spending 
A double-spending attacker may first publish a transaction 
TX1. When he receives a service or a commodity from the seller, 
he publishes an alternative transaction TX2. In Bitcoin, blocks are 
infrequent and miners collect transactions until they form a block. 
Until that time, transaction TX1 may be replaced by another 
transaction TX2 without any cost. Therefore, according to an 
empirical conclusion, when a transaction is packaged into a block 
and follows by 6 new blocks later on a chain, that transaction can 
be considered to be confirmed. Furthermore, publication of 
conflicting transactions with different destinations is prohibited by 
standard Bitcoin software, which also warns the user of 
conflicting transactions propagating in the network [27]. In 
Bicomp, as introduced in section 3.5, each macroblock that 
contained transactions is referred to by the following macroblock 
on the blockchain. Therefore, to perform a double-spending attack, 
a node must have enough hash power to realize a selfish mining 
attack as follow. 
A selfish attacker constructs two different macroblocks using 
the same header privately: M1 and M2. M1 contains less non-
overlapped transactions but has a poison transaction TXP. M2 
contains more non-overlapped transactions but without TXP. The 
attacker first reveals M1 to public and privately mine on M2. In 
this situation, even if honest miners construct a new macroblock 
on M1, say M1’, the private attacker can still use M2 and the 
selfish mined M2’ to replace both M1 and M1’ on the legitimate 
chain. Since M2 contains more non-overlapped transactions than 
M1, this may increase the possibility of success with such 
replacement. Such behavior can result in double-spending attacks. 
However, we should note that M2 is also a selfish mined block 
which may have low diversity compared to the public-mined one, 
i.e., M1’. Furthermore, to realize such attack, at least 1/4 hash 
power is required even in Bitcoin as introduced above. Due to the 
existence of multiple defensive mechanisms in Bicomp as 
introduced, it is intuitive that more hash power is required to 
perform such attack successfully in Bicomp. We leave the 
theoretical proof as a future work. Besides, a delay confirmation 
for transactions as done in the Bitcoin is also useful to avoid such 
attack in Bicomp.  
4.3 Fork 
Fork in Bitcoin or other PoW based protocols often happens 
due to the existence of packet propagation delay in network. That 
is, multiple blocks are generated after the same prefix since the 
miners fail to receive a previous generated block before they 
repeat the mining work. To solve this, Bitcoin limits the block 
size to 1 MB.  
In contrast, Bicomp decreases the chance of such fork since a 
macroblock header will always come first before the generation of 
other kind of blocks. Therefore, microblock miners will always 
choose a header to follow before it starts to mine and wait for the 
incoming macroblocks. Recall that a header’s size is only 200 
bytes, so that it can be spread throughout the network very quickly 
and thus largely decrease the possibility of fork. 
However, in a large network, Bicomp may still experience 
fork when multiple macroblock headers are generated after the 
same prefix of a macroblock due to the network delay. We claim 
that such fork is not purely harmful to our system. That is, as we 
have discussed, a branch with more computational power and high 
transaction diversity will be selected as the legitimate one, the 
existence of fork has the potential to curb the effects of Sybil 
attacks and selfish mining. 
4.4 Single-Point Failure at Leader 
In Bicomp, there exists only one leader who is allowed for 
mining a macroblock at one round. As a result, mechanisms 
should be designed to avoid single-point failure at leader and 
resist to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. In our 
design, each node who has accepted a macroblock header from a 
leader, will wait until it receives a valid macroblock or the end of 
that leader’s tenure, whenever comes first. If a node never 
receives a valid macroblock from the current leader before its 
tenure ends, it will initiate the leader-election process based on the 
latest macroblock restored locally. Here, those headers, which 
were generated at the same time with the out-of-date one, can be 
reused and re-broadcasted immediately to the network. In terms of 
judging a leader’s expiration locally, a node b should determine a 
waiting time E as follows: 
E = T(a) – [Tb(a) – Tts(a)] + ߜ,         (1) 
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phase block generation process, i.e., leader election and 
transaction packaging. In the leader-election phase, PoW based 
computation is employed for generating a macroblock header to 
compete for leadership. In transaction packaging phase, any node 
except the leader can join the process and package transactions 
they received and generate microblocks, which compose the final 
macroblock. In Bicomp, a leader has no right to pack any 
transactions but only allowed to use microblocks from others to 
generate a macroblock, which forms a bilayer structure of blocks. 
By doing so, the leader’s power is limited and other nodes are also 
encouraged to play significant roles in block generation process. 
Besides, incentives are also elaborately designed to motivate 
different participants. In general, Bicomp fairly decentralizes 
network power, utilizes the sharding nature of the network, 
increases the efficiency via concurrent packaging process, and 
reduces the long-distance transmission and flooding of numerous 
transactions in the network. Security analysis and evaluation for 
Bicomp are proposed, which shows better performance than 
Bitcoin and Ethereum in terms of the security and scalability. 
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